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Mental illness is different
and ignoring its differences
profits nobody
Tom Burns1
Szmukler, Daw and Dawson have produced a detailed and carefully worded proposal for a new approach
fusing mental health and capacity legislation. In practice their proposal abolishes separate mental health
legislation. It aims to ensure that compulsory care for the mentally ill is provided, when needed, according
to the same principles as in severe disabling physical disorders (e.g. toxic confusion states, acute head
injury, dementia). Their proposal derives from two strongly held and clearly presented principles – respect
for the autonomy of the psychiatric patient and removal of what they consider the stigmatising
discrimination between mental and physical illness. Capacity becomes the threshold for considering any
compulsory detention or treatment.
Their paper is in two parts. It starts with an introduction outlining the principles behind the proposed
‘fusion’ legislation and an overview of its practice. This is then followed by an extensive preliminary draft
of their model statute in eight parts. These eight parts contain a detailed presentation of the mechanics
and definitions of the processes of the statute; they cover details such as the different proposed orders,
safeguards, operation of tribunals and even details of the transfer of patients to hospital. Drafting
legislation is a complex and tricky undertaking and they appear to have made an excellent start.
I will restrict my commentary to their introduction. This reflects my primary sphere of competence as a
clinical academic psychiatrist, not a lawyer. It is also my experience that few, if any, clinicians ever read
the details of legislation. Most familiarise themselves ‘on the job’ with the mechanics of those parts of the
Act they regularly use. They learn what they have to sign and complete in order to achieve what they
have already clinically decided on. Gaining any understanding of the principles of the Act is usually
through exposure to where it restricts their clinical decisions. Such learning is via simple, practical
requirements such as confirming ‘treatability’ or ‘danger to others’ in the detention of specific individuals. 
Where I describe ‘what psychiatrists do’ it is based on my direct experience of practice in the UK and in
a range of international jurisdictions where I have worked alongside colleagues. These include various
European countries, the USA, New Zealand and Australia and also in India and Hong Kong – in no way
a scientific sample. However, I have been impressed by the strikingly similar decision-making processes
and declared professional values of psychiatrists; this despite widely differing social and healthcare
contexts and a range of mental health legislations. It will be clear that I do not believe that mental
illnesses are ‘simply social constructs’ but have a consistency and reality beyond our diagnostic manuals
and legal definitions. It is the nature of mental illnesses and their treatments that shape mental health
legislation: not mental health legislation that shapes mental health practice (other than at the edges). 
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My critique of this proposal is contained in four questions.
Is the case advanced for the importance of treating mental illness and physical illness in exactly the same
manner convincing?
Does the proposed law accurately reflect and address the ethical challenges faced daily in mental health
practice – will it provide a useful and accessible guide to the practitioner?
Does the proposed law bring greater clarity to our understanding of the nature of mental illness and how
society can best relate to it?
Does the proposed law reduce ethical confusion in mental health practice; in particular can it reduce the
risk of moral jeopardy?
Despite important insights and obvious merit I believe that, on balance, it fails on three of these four tests.
1. Is the case advanced for treating mental illness and physical illness in exactly
the same manner convincing?
Szmukler and colleagues consider that differences in how mental and physical health care are delivered
constitute unacceptable discrimination ‘ ..that separate legislation authorising the civil commitment of
‘mentally disordered’ persons is unnecessary, and discriminatory…’, ‘..this ‘two-track’ approach is
inconsistent with general principles of heath care ethics….’. They advance no specific reason why
treating mental illnesses and physical illnesses differently is unacceptable or damaging. They rely on the
implication that to discriminate between them is inherently unjust. Why should this be so? 
Psychiatry is not a subspecialty of medicine in the same way that dermatology or nephrology derived from
internal medicine. It did not arise from a necessary division of labour, driven by a rapidly expanding body
of knowledge and skills. Its history is one of convergence with general medicine rather than emergence from
it. Indeed the terms ‘mental illness’ and ‘mental patient’ have been in use for less than half of  psychiatry’s
existence. 
Modern mental health care is a product of the Enlightenment, most commonly identified with the
emergence of moral therapy. This is dated from Pinel’s striking off the chains from the Paris lunatics in
1793 and the opening of the York Retreat in 1796 by the Tukes, an English Quaker family. Both
emphasised the irrelevance of the then current medical nostrums; the Tukes strove actively to keep
physicians out of asylums for the following 30 years. The term ‘Psychiatry’ was first coined by Johann Reil
in 1808 (from psyche, mind and iatros doctor) to stress its empirical rather than theological provenance2,3;
Reil was mainly concerned to codify psychotherapeutic approaches4. Only as late as 1930 in the UK were
the terms ‘lunatic’ and ‘asylum’ officially replaced by ‘mental patient’ and ‘mental hospital’. 
These earlier terms (and practices) do not indicate any ignorance of the physical basis of many mental
illnesses. Asylum doctors were in no doubt of the organic origins of disorders such as General Paralysis of
the Insane, alcoholic dementia and Pellagra. These constituted a significant proportion of their patients.
Recognising substantial overlap between physical and mental illnesses but also essential difference has
never been impossible. Ignoring these differences, or using terminology that obscures them, does not
2 Ellenberger HF. ‘The discovery of the unconscious: the history and evolution of dynamic psychiatry’. New York: Basic Books;
1970.
3 Marneros A. ‘Psychiatry’s 200th birthday’. British Journal of Psychiatry 2008 Jul;193(1):1-3.
4 Reil J. ‘Rhapsodies on the Application of the Psychic Cure Method to Mental Disorders’. Halle: Curtsche Buchhandlung; 1803.
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make them go away. Whether the similarities between mental and physical illnesses are greater or less
than their differences is more a philosophical than empirical issue. However few would deny it is an issue.
The degree to which mental illness and physical illness have to be treated exactly alike in legislation has
to be argued, not simply assumed from the similarity of the terms. 
2. Does the proposed law accurately reflect and address the ethical challenges
faced daily in mental health practice – will it provide a useful and accessible
guide to the practitioner?
The UK’s tortuous ten year attempt to update the Mental Health Act 1983, resulting in the 2007
amendment,5 can be interpreted in two ways. One is as a failure of resolve to properly grasp the principles
of the primacy of autonomy, using capacity as the threshold for compulsion, as outlined here and
originally proposed by Richardson’s expert committee6. The other is that the proposals were rejected as
judged not to adequately address common, and serious clinical challenges, and to run the risk of
unacceptable and unforeseen consequences. 
Szmukler and colleagues comment ‘…protecting the autonomy of patients with capacity is not the only
important ethical principle…..another concerns the need to protect other people…’. They are certainly
right that protecting autonomy is not the only important ethical principle. Indeed it is the failure to
explore the full range of important, and well recognised, principles of medical ethics that is so strikingly
absent from this analysis. All ethical decisions include the need to balance several, often equally
important and frequently conflicting principles (e.g. Liberty, Equality, Fraternity). In medical ethics
respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-malfeasance and justice are generally considered to be a minimal
ethical framework for decision making and analysis7. These may often be in conflict. Amartya Sen argues
for humility and an empirical approach to derive an area of ‘circumscribed congruence’8 for making moral
judgements about competing claims for different individual freedoms9. 
For most clinicians beneficence is at least as important as respect for autonomy. After all getting people
better is the main purpose of medical care. Virtually all difficult decisions about coercion in mental health
involve balancing the potential for beneficence against the overriding of autonomy for an individual
patient. It is the silence of Szmukler et als’ (and Richardson’s) proposals on this tension that renders the
capacity argument inadequate to many clinical readers. For example only with the most tortuous logic
can the compulsory detention of a distraught adolescent intent on suicide because of a broken love-affair
be justified in terms of capacity. However few psychiatrists would hesitate to use it if they ‘had to’;
beneficence so clearly overwhelms autonomy in this situation. Most compulsion is used in individuals
with established, fluctuating psychotic illnesses. Patients with schizophrenia are usually detained because
the doctor thinks that treatment will significantly enhance their well-being, not because they are at
immediate risk of dying or hurting others. 
We may dress decision up as risk, and sometimes have to. In some jurisdictions the language of risk has
replaced that of therapeutic benefit. However, only the most disingenuous observer will believe that risk
5 Draft Mental Health Bill, Session 2004–05, Volume 1,
HL Paper 79-1, HC 95-1, House of Lords House of
Commons Joint Committee on the Draft Mental Health
Bill, (2005).
6 Department of Health. Report of the Expert Committee:
Review of the Mental Health Act 1983. London:
Department of Health; 1999. 
7 Beauchamp TL, Childress JF. ‘Principles of Biomedical
Ethics’. 5th ed. New York: Oxford University Press; 2001.
8 Sen A. ‘What Theory of Justice’? 7 A.D. May 30;
Sheldonian Theatre, Oxford:OPHI Conference
http://ophi.org.uk/subindex.php?id=video0; 2007.
9 Sen A. ‘What do we want from a theory of justice’? The
Journal of Philosophy 2006;CIII(5):215-38.
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assessment has genuinely replaced therapeutic considerations in the doctor’s decision making. Where the
legislation requires ‘risk of harm’ for compulsory admission I have watched psychiatrists emphasise
suicidality (particularly when access to beds is restricted) whilst making exactly the same clinical decision
where I use benefit to health as the justification. Neither of us is in any doubt that we are both making
our judgements in exactly the same way based primarily on beneficence. 
This proposal fails to engage with the central role of beneficence (indeed paternalism) that has always
lain at the heart of psychiatric practice. The distortions of judgement and lack of personal choice in some
mental illnesses complicate the assessment of beneficence in a way that it unique. Isaiah Berlin, in his
essay Two Concepts of Liberty10, proposes that sometimes ‘liberty from’ (i.e. autonomy from intrusion) has
to be compromised to ensure the ‘liberty to’ (i.e. capacity to do, as Sen would use it). Nowhere is this
dilemma more sharply drawn than in the practice of mental health and is explored in the next section.
3. Does the proposed law bring greater clarity to our understanding of the
nature of mental illness and how society can best relate to it?
One of the great advantages of this proposal is that emphasising the careful assessment of capacity puts
something of a brake on psychiatry’s seemingly inexorable expansion. As ‘mental illness’ has been
replaced by ‘mental disorder’ the concept has been diluted to the point where psychiatry’s conceptual
coherence and social legitimacy are seriously challenged. This is even more so as mental disorders are
currently defined almost exclusively in terms of international classifications such as DSM IV11 and ICD
1012 where reliability completely overshadows validity. Requiring capacity for the detention of patients
could force a necessary debate, for example, on the vexed issue of ‘personality disorders’, and the
increasing long-term detention of ‘PD’ patients for public safety. The definition of incapacity presented
by Szmukler and colleagues (despite the proposal that it be ‘…sufficiently flexible … [for] … the complex
and subtle forms of incapacity found in some mental disorders.’) would clearly preclude the detention of
personality disordered individuals even without a ‘treatability’ test.
However this does not address the fundamental nature of mental illness. It is the impaired appraisal of
the self and world with their impact on the individuals’ behaviour that are central. Mental illness implies
a changed state, a distancing from the normal self. Mentally ill patients are ‘alienated’ not so much from
society but alienated from their normal selves. Treatment has always been aimed at ‘restoring to reason’.
Severe developmental impairments and personality disorders can lie at the absolute extreme of social
deviance and disability but we do not consider them mental illnesses. 
When we speak of mental illness we implicitly use the concepts of first and second order desires clarified
by the American philosopher Harry Frankfurt13. Frankfurt considers the defining characteristic of a
human being (‘personhood’) that they can have desires or wishes about their wishes. Unlike non-humans
we ‘can want to want’. The alcoholic wants to drink (a first order desire) but he also wants to not want
to drink (a second order desire). 
The legitimacy of psychiatry as a discipline (and mental illness as a concept) rests on believing this, and
believing that we can make reasonably meaningful judgements about an individual’s second order desires.
10 Berlin I. ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’. Oxford: Clarendon
Press; 1958.
11 American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and
statistical manual of mental disorders (Fourth Edition).
Washington DC: American Psychiatric Association; 1994.
12 World Health Organisation. The ICD-10 Classification of
Mental and Behavioural Disorders. Geneva: World
Health Organisation; 1992.
13 Frankfurt HG. ‘Freedom of the Will and Concept of a
Person’. Journal of Philosophy 1971;68(1):5-20.
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In short we believe we can construct an understanding of a person’s ‘healthy’ state of being and contrast
it with their current ‘ill’ state. The justification for over-riding their current declared wishes is that we
believe that it is likely that when not ill they would think and act differently. Often this judgement has
to be made without prior acquaintance with the individual and may be based on a current diagnosis from
which it is extrapolated. This judgement balances the two liberties that Berlin distinguished14 as his
‘liberty from’ and ‘liberty to’. Just and moral action often requires us to make a judgement about what
people are capable of and would want to do as we weigh up their dilemma (‘ .. to offer political rights or
safeguards….to men who are …underfed and diseased is to mock their condition..’)15. Decisions are
made on a judgement of how the individual is now, compared to how we hypothesise they are ‘normally’;
rounded judgements are not made ahistorically solely on the dimension of their current capacity. 
Obviously such judgements are not perfect – a significant proportion of patients (though not all by any
means) persist in disagreeing with their treatment when recovered16. Continued disagreement is more
common when recovery is only partial17. Szmukler and colleagues are also right that risk and
consequences should enter into the equation but surely wrong to give them such prominence. It is striking
that the only reference to treatment benefit is in the paragraph outlining the use of compulsion for
dangerous but capacitous individuals.
In a laudable drive to reduce stigma and discrimination against the mentally ill this proposal risks blunting
and obscuring our already limited understanding of what mental illness is. While this may bring some
short-term gains the poor fit of the legislation with the reality of mental illness can only, over time, begin
to chafe and distort practice. Mental illness has never been an easy concept. However, retreating from its
complexity and substituting simpler, more easily quantified proxies, carries real risks for the profession and
society and thus risks for patients. 
4. Does the proposed law reduce ethical confusion in mental health practice; in
particular can it reduce the risk of moral jeopardy?
Emphasising capacity certainly may reduce some of the ethical risks in psychiatry. This is particularly
pressing in its involvement in the long-term incarceration of individuals with unacceptable personality
disorders or sexual, addictive and violent behaviours. This is much to be welcomed. On balance it
remains unclear whether or not the current proposal is an advance. The test will be whether capacity
(backed up by risk) will serve better over the long term than the concept of mental illness (with its
implication of impaired judgement and a distinction between the ill and normal self) in the hard, ethically
ambiguous cases that will inevitably confront any legislation. 
The concept of mental illness has certainly been abused both by the profession and by external agents
(governments, pharmaceutical companies etc). Would we be better served by a sharper distinction
between mental illness and mental disorder or should we accept (as here) mental disorder but with a
clearer threshold for coercion? The former approach offers no short-term solution (mental illnesses
inevitably require constant negotiation about their boundaries). It is also out of favour with a hard-line
evidence-based approach that emphasises reliability and science rather than validity and the ‘craft’ nature
14 Berlin I. ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1958.
15 Berlin I. ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1958.
16 Priebe S, Katsakou C, Amos T, Leese M, Morriss R, Rose D, et al. ‘Patients’ views and readmissions 1 year after involuntary
hospitalisation’. British J Psychiatry 2009;194(1):49-54.
17 Katsakou C, Priebe S. ‘Outcomes of involuntary hospital admission – a review’. Acta Psychiatr Scand 2006 Oct;114(4):232-41.
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of professions. Capacity is a reasonably objectively defined threshold, likely to achieve high reliability and
durability. 
The down-side of this otherwise very attractive proposition is evident in the paper. Having started off
with a clear definition of capacity, the authors then fall back on the need for a flexible definition to cover
the ‘complex and subtle’ forms of incapacity in mental illness. They avoid potential practices that might
equate treatment with punishment. However their implied ethical hierarchy in which beneficence, justice
and non-malfeasance seem secondary to autonomy and risk remains of concern. It distracts attention
from the moral jeopardy of indeterminate psychiatric incarceration of individuals who neither have a
mental illness nor any reasonable prospect of effective treatment.
Conclusion
The desire to create coherent, intellectually satisfying legislation to cover compulsory treatment in
mental health is not new. I would argue that the messiness of mental illnesses, in particular the need for
a high order, and inevitably speculative, judgement about a patient’s ‘normal self’ defeats this admirable
intention. The diagnosis of mental illness demands both a careful narrative and a descriptive framework
and defies a simple cross sectional ‘check list’ approach. Current diagnostic manuals give a misleadingly
optimistic impression as clinicians still use narrative thinking acquired in their professional training but
use the check-list approach to improve reliability. This improved reliability has, however, been at the cost
of a staggering increase in the number of people diagnosed. 
A more robust MHA based solidly round capacity would initially improve consistency of practice.
However, a reliance on a simple threshold (and one that will undoubtedly be stretched as expedient) and
the removal of a professional judgement about whether the patient has an identifiable illness (not a
disorder) and is no longer their normal self will probably lead to an increase in compulsion, not a
reduction. We should not forget that (at least in the UK) it was the profession’s stubborn refusal to bend
the act to detain non mentally-ill, dangerous individuals that stimulated the most sustained pressure to
change it.
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